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Essays
Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit
Selection Law
Barton P. Jenks, III*

A recent study by the American Judicature Society (AJS)l
identifies twenty-three states including Rhode Island in which
supreme court justices are appointed by the governor from a small
number of nominees recommended by a nonpartisan nominating
commission. 2 In fourteen of these states the same procedure ap* B.A. University of Michigan; J.D. University of Virginia School of Law.
Member of the Virginia Bar.
1. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States Appellate
and General Jurisdiction Courts (1986) (Revised Mar. 3, 1996) as augmented by
American Judicature Society, Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status (Sept. 1995)
[hereinafter collectively AJS Study] (on file with the Roger Williams University
Law Review).
2. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont
and Wyoming. AJS Study, supra note 1. The 22 states other than Rhode Island
and the legal bases for the use of nominating commissions in selecting supreme
court justices and judges for intermediate appellate courts are as follows: Alaska
(Ala. Const. art. IV, § 8; Ala. Stat. § 22.05.080 (1988)); Arizona (Ariz. Const. art.
VI, §§ 36-37); Colorado (Colo. Const. art. VI, §§ 20, 24); Connecticut (Conn. Const.
art. V, § 2; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a (1993)); Delaware (Exec. Order No. 3 as
amended Exec. Order No. 10 (1993)); Florida (Fla. Const. art. V, § 11; Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 43.29 (1995)); Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. VI, § 3-4); Indiana (Ind. Const. art.
VII, § 9-10; Ind. Code Ann. § 33-2.1-4-1 et seq. (1996)); Iowa (Iowa Const. art. V,
§ 15; Iowa Code Ann. § 46.1 et seq. (1991)); Kansas (Kan. Coust. art. III, § 5; Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 20-119 et seq. (1995)); Maryland (Exec. Order No. 01.01.1995.10 as
amended Exec. Order No. 01.01.1995.13 (1995)); Massachusetts (Exec. Order No.
319 (1991)); Missouri (Mo. Const. art. V, §§ 25(a)-(d); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 10); Nebraska
(Neb. Const. art. V, § 21; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-801 to 812 (1989)); New Mexico
(N.M. Const. art. VI, § 35); New York (N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 2; N.Y. Judiciary Law
§ 62 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996)); Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. VII-B, § 3-4);
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plies to the filling of vacancies on all other state courts 3 and in the
remaining nine states it applies to the filling of at least some lower
court vacancies. 4 The intention of merit selection laws is to promote the selection of judges based exclusively on merit rather
than on the basis of political and other extrajudicial considerations. This "depoliticization" of the judicial selection process has
long been the central goal of merit selection law proponents. 5 In
1906, Roscoe Pound, who was later to become one of America's
greatest law professor's and a founding member of the AJS said,
"[p]utting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional
resect for the bench."6
By virtue of a law enacted in mid-1994, 7 and the approval of a
constitutional amendment by the state's voters in November of the
same year," Rhode Island became one of the fourteen states with
South Dakota (S.D. Const. art. V, § 9; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 16-1A-1 to 161A-9 (1995)); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-102 to 17-4-112 (1994)); Utah
(Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-12-101 to 20A-12-105 (1995)); Vermont (Vt. Const. art. II,
§ 32; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 601-608 (1988)); Wyoming (Wyo. Const. art. V, § 4;
Wyo. Stat. § 5-1-102 (1992)); see also AJS Study supra note 1.
3. The fourteen states are those listed supra note 2, except Arizona, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Tennessee.
AJS study, supra note 1.
4. Another eleven states use nominating commissions but only to fill
midterm vacancies on some or all courts. They are Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
and Wisconsin. AJS study, supra note 1.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of state merit selection laws see Jona
Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Proceduresand Issues, 49 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1 (1994).
6. Goldschmidt, supra note 5 at 6 (quoting from Pound's speech "The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice").
7. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1994).
8. The constitutional amendment drastically changed Sections 4 and 5 of Article X of the Rhode Island Constitution. Section 4 had provided for the election of
Supreme Court justices by the Senate and House of Representatives in grand committee. R.I. Const., art. X, § 4 (amended 1994). As modified, it provides for the
Governor to fill any Supreme Court vacancy by nominating, on the basis of merit, a
person from a list submitted by an independent non-partisan nominating commission, and by and with the consent of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
given separately, appointing such person to fill the vacancy. It further provides
that the same procedure shall apply to the filling of vacancies in the Superior
Court, Family Court, District Court, Workers' Compensation Court, Administrative Adjudication Court "or any other state court which the General Assembly may
from time to time establish," except that with respect to such vacancies only the
advice and consent of the Senate is required. Finally, Section 4 as modified pro-
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merit selection laws of general application. The new law governs
the composition, duties and powers of the state's judicial nominating commission, as well as the method of nominating and confirming judicial appointees.
The law is a dramatic departure from past procedure. Prior to
the adoption of the new judicial selection procedure, Supreme
Court justices were elected by the Rhode Island General Assembly
in grand committee. 9 Lower court judges were appointed by the
governor subject to confirmation by the Senate. 10
Although the new judicial selection procedure is flawed, it unquestionably is an improvement over its predecessor, which resulted in the General Assembly's election of two Supreme Court
chief justices who were forced to resign from office under the threat
of impeachment and another Supreme Court justice who was rated
unqualified by the Rhode Island Bar Association.
Part I of this essay describes the principal provisions of Rhode
Island's new judicial selection law. Part II of this article critically
assesses the law and makes suggestions for its improvement. In
doing so, it will compare provisions of Rhode Island's law to similar
provisions existing in the merit selection laws of other states. Part
III provides a summing up.

vides that the powers, duties and composition of the judicial nominating commission shall be defined by statute. R.I. Const., art. X, § 4.
Section 5 authorized the General Assembly in grand committee to fill Supreme
Court vacancies "until the next election," provided for "the judge then elected [to]
hold office as here before provided," and empowered the Governor in case of impeachment or "temporary absence or inability" to appoint a person "to discharge
the duties of the office during the vacancy caused thereby." R.I. Const. art. X, § 5
(amended 1994). In Section 5 as modified such provisions are omitted and replaced by the following single sentence: "Tenure of Supreme Court Justices - Justices of the Supreme Court shall hold office during good behavior." R.I. Const. art.

X, § 5.
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-1.1-1 et seq. (repealed 1994). When the General Assembly is in Grand Committee the members of the Senate and House vote together,
rather than separately in their respective houses; however, the presence of a majority of all members of each house is required in order for a quorum of the Grand
Committee to exist. See R.I. Const., art. IV, §§ 6-7.
10. The relevant statutory provisions were R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-2 (repealed
1994) (Superior Court), § 8-8-7 (amended 1994) (District Court), § 8-10-11 (Family
Court), § 28-30-2 (Workers' Compensation Court) and § 31-43-1 (repealed 1994)
(Administrative Adjudication Court).
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THE LAW'S PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS

A. Selection of Commission Members
The new law provides for an independent nonpartisan judicial
nominating commission consisting of four attorneys," four "members of the general public" (non-lawyers), 12 and a ninth member
who may be either an attorney or a non-lawyer. 13 All are to be
appointed by the governor. Four members, three attorneys and one
non-lawyer, are to be persons entirely within the governor's discretion. However, the governor's choice of the remaining five members is restricted to persons nominated by General Assembly
officers. The House Speaker, the Senate Majority Leader, the
House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader must each
submit the names of at least three persons to the governor, with
qualifications as follows: The Speaker's nominees must be attorneys; those of the Senate Majority Leader may be either attorneys
or non-lawyers; and those of the House and Senate Minority Leaders must be non-lawyers. The governor must designate one commission member from each of these four panels and a fifth member
from among four non-lawyers nominated by the Speaker and the
Senate Majority Leader jointly.
In nominating commission members the four legislative leaders must "exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic
and gender diversity within the commission," and the governor
must exercise like efforts in choosing commission members.
Certain persons are disqualified from serving as commission
members by reason of their positions or activities.' 4 Members
11.

The term "attorney" is defined as a resident of Rhode Island who is hi-

censed to practice law in the state and is a member in good standing of the Rhode

Island Bar Association. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-1.
12.

The term "member of the general public" is defined as a resident of Rhode

Island who is not a licensed member of any bar association. Id. A retired lawyer or
judge could come within the definition.
13. In carrying out their duties the governor and the four legislative leaders
must "exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic and gender diversity

within the commission." R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-2(a)3.
14. No person may be appointed a commission member if he or she is, or
within one year before appointment has been, a legislator, judge, elected official,
candidate for any public office, the holder of any compensated federal, state or mu-

nicipal public office (other than that of notary public) or the holder of elected office
in a political party; and a commission member who becomes any of the foregoing
may not continue to serve on the commission. Nor may more than one member or
employee of a single law firm, or of a single corporation (whether for profit or not
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serve for staggered four-year terms and until their successors are
appointed and qualified.1 5 However, a member appointed to replace a commissioner who has ceased to be such before his or her
term has expired, serves only for the balance of such term rather
than for four years. Members, including those serving for less than
a full term, are ineligible for reappointment when their terms expire. They receive no compensation but are entitled to reimbursement for their reasonable and necessary expenses. No member
may be appointed a judge while serving or for a period of one year
after his or her service ends.
Any vacancy in the commission apparently is to be filled in the
same manner as the vacated position was originally filled
although, because of poor draftsmanship, this intent can only be
inferred.1 6 The governor is empowered to remove any commission
member for neglect of duty, malfeasance in office or conviction of a
criminal offense.
The commission's chairperson is to be appointed by the governor from among its members and is to serve "for the duration of his
or her tenure." Five members of the commission are required for a
quorum and at least five members of the commission must approve
"all names submitted to the governor."

for profit), be a member of the commission; although not explicitly made clear, this
prohibition appears intended to apply only to the simultaneous commission membership of two persons from the same law firm or corporation. Id. § 8-16.1-2(c).
15. The initial appointees serve for staggered terms as follows: (1) one of the
attorneys who is a person of the Governor's choice and the appointee from the
panel submitted by the House Minority Leader, one year; (2) one of the attorneys
who is a person of the Governor's choice and the appointee from the panel submitted by the Senate Minority Leader, two years; (3) the non-lawyer who is a person of
the Governor's choice and the appointee from the panel submitted by the Speaker
and the Senate Majority Leader jointly, three years; and (4) one of the attorneys
who is a person of the Governor's choice and the appointees from the panels submitted by the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader acting individually, four
years. Id. § 8-16.1-2(b)1 to 4. Thus, of the initial commission members two serve
for one year, two serve for two years, two serve for three years and three serve for
four years.
16. The law provides that vacancies other than those arising through the expiration of a term shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term "in the same
manner as vacancies due to the expiration of a term." However, it inexplicably
omits to say how the latter vacancies are to be filled. Id. § 8-16.1-2(c).
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Powers and Duties of Commission

The commission is empowered "to adopt rules and procedures
which aid in its selection of the most highly qualified nominees for
judicial office." 17 However, all meetings of the commission are to
be subject to the state's open meetings law.' 8
In selecting the best qualified nominees for recommendation to
the governor, the commission is to consider, but need not limit itself to the following factors: "intellect, ability, temperament, impartiality, diligence, experience, maturity, education, publications,
and record of public, community and government service." 19 In
carrying out their duties the governor and the four legislative leaders must "exercise reasonable efforts to encourage racial, ethnic
and gender diversity within the commission." 20 The commission
must exercise like efforts to encourage such diversity in nominat17. R.I. Gen. Laws 8-16.1-2(e). Pursuant to such authority the commission
has adopted "Uniform Rules of Procedure." Among other things, such rules (1) require the commission to investigate the fitness and qualifications of each candidate
for judicial office "utilizing all sources reasonably available within the time [allowed to it to act]," (2) enumerate 26 criteria the commission is to consider in evaluating candidates, (3) authorize the commission to invite candidates to appear
before it to respond to questions, (4) provide that only candidates who have been so
interviewed shall be voted on, (5) specify a procedure involving multiple rounds of
voting to be followed in narrowing down the number of candidates for a judgeship
to not more than five nor less than three who are favored by at least five commission members, (6) provide for making public in alphabetical order, without any
indication of commission preference, the names of nominees recommended to the
governor, (7) provide for the submission to the governor of such names in alphabetical order without any indication of commission preference together with "a copy of
all investigative information and documents relating to each nominee," and (8)
specify 12 newspapers, including several in the Portuguese and Spanish language,
in which judicial vacancies are to be advertised.
The rules further require that applicants for judicial office complete and sign
under oath a lengthy "Personal Data Questionnaire" and a "Financial Statement"
generally similar to the financial statement required of candidates for elective public office; in addition, such candidates are to supply copies of "Federal income tax
returns." The rules also provide that the commission is to encourage written public
comment on the qualifications of "interviewees" and, following public notice, shall
entertain "oral comments" at a public meeting to be held before it votes on the
candidates to fill a judicial vacancy. Uniform Rules of Procedure for the Judicial
Nominating Commission (Jan. 19, 1995).
18. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16-1-2(e) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-1 et seq.
Although the judicial selection law makes no mention of the state's open records
law, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-1 et seq., the commission's rules expressly recognize
the applicability of such law to it.
19. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-4(a).
20. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-16.1-4(b).
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ing candidates to fill judicial vacancies. Moreover, a separate provision, inserted into the law at the last minute, requires that in
evaluating candidates for judgeships the commission shall "consider the candidate's sensitivity to historically disadvantaged
classes, and may disqualify any candidate with a demonstrated
21
history of bias toward any of these classes."
C.

Confirmation of Governor's JudicialAppointees

The governor must immediately notify the commission of any
vacancy or prospective vacancy in a court. The commission is to
advertise for each such vacancy, solicit prospective candidates, and
consider names received from any source. Then, within sixty days
after a Supreme Court vacancy occurs, it must "publicly submit"
the names of not less than three, nor more than five, highly qualified attorneys to fill the vacancy. 2 2 Within ten days after such public submission, the governor must nominate one of the persons on
23
the commission's list to fill the vacancy.
Following the governor's designation of a nominee to fill a
Supreme Court vacancy, the nomination is to be "forwarded forthwith" to the Senate and House. Each house is then allowed thirty
days after receipt of the nomination to separately confirm the nominee. 2 4 In considering whether the governor's nominee to fill a
Supreme Court vacancy should be confirmed, the judiciary committees of the Senate and House must separately conduct an investigation 2 5 and public hearing on the question of the nominee's
21. Id.
22. The commission's rules call attention to the fact that the attorneys nominated must satisfy the requirements of the Rhode Island Constitution concerning
eligibility to hold state or local public office. See R.I. Const., art. III, §§ 1-2, 6.
23. Presumably a "public submission" takes place when the commission has
delivered a list of its nominees to the governor and has publicly released the names
of such nominees.
24. Although the time allowed for confirmation begins "after said submission,"
the law does not permit the Senate and House to "consider" the nomination until
"after seven (7) calendar days of receipt of said nomination." R.I. Gen. Laws § 816.1-5(c). The intent of this provision is not clear. Does it mean that nothing can
be done during the seven day period (for example, starting the investigation required by law) or does it only preclude formal deliberations? One might also ask
whether this provision really is needed. At the very least, its intent ought to be
clarified.
25. Id. § 8.16.1-5(d). In connection with its investigation concerning a nominee for judicial office, the judiciary committee of each legislative body involved in
the confirmation proceeding is to be furnished "a report compiled by the state po-
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qualifications; and each body is empowered to issue subpoenas and
take testimony under oath.
If either body rejects the nominee, the commission must submit to the governor a new list of three to five candidates. This new
list may include names previously submitted other than that of the
rejected nominee. The governor must designate a nominee from
the new list and submit the name to the Senate and House for confirmation as in the case of the original nomination. If the new
nominee is rejected, the procedure is repeated until a nominee has
been confirmed.
If a nominee to fill any judicial vacancy is neither confirmed
nor rejected within the period of time allowed, the law provides
that the governor must appoint "some other person" to fill the vacancy. If the General Assembly is not in session when a judicial
vacancy occurs, the governor may fill the vacancy without the required confirmation but the appointee serves only until the General Assembly is next convened. The governor must then make a
new appointment-presumably reappointing the incumbent-and
have the appointee confirmed.
II. ASSESSMENT OF RHODE IsLAND's LAw
Although the new judicial selection law appears to be generally regarded as a great improvement over the law previously in
effect it unfortunately is seriously flawed. Commenting on an editorial calling attention to the law's flaws and principal provisions
written by this author 2 6 and printed in the Providence Journal
lice in conjunction with the attorney general's office indicating the determinations
and findings of [their] investigations concerning the background of [such] nominee." The report is to include, but not be limited to, whether the nominee has ever
(1) been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor or felony in Rhode Island,
any other state or any foreign country, (2) filed a personal bankruptcy petition or
an assignment for the benefit of creditors in any such jurisdiction, (3) been a partner, 10% shareholder or office holder in any sole proprietorship, partnership or
corporation which, while such affiliation existed, was 'involved in bankruptcy or
receivership actions as a debtor or because of insolvency," or (4) had a civil judgment rendered against him or her, in Rhode Island, any other state or any foreign
country, arising out of an allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, libel, slander,
professional negligence or any intentional tort. Id. §§ 8-16.1-5(e)-(e)3. In addition
to receiving the foregoing information, the judiciary committee must require each
nominee to submit a financial statement "to determine his or her compliance with
the provisions of [the state's Code of Ethics]." Id. § 8-16.1-5(g).
26. See Barton P. Jenks, III, The Flaws in Rhode Island's New JudicialSelection Process, Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 14, 15, 1995 at A9, All.
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Bulletin, a distinguished professor of law with a special interest in
judicial selection stated, Rhode Island's judicial selection law "appears to be a model of what not to do in creating a nominating
27
commission system."
For purposes of this critique, the law's flaws can be divided
into what may be called conceptual flaws and flaws of execution.
Conceptual flaws are those relating to the law's basic design.
Flaws of execution, on the other hand, pertain to provisions in the
law which are defective either because their implications were not
fully thought out or, in several instances, because of inept or careless drafting.
A.

Conceptual Flaws

The most striking aspects of the new law are the degree to
which it provides for the involvement of legislators in the judicial
selection process and its denial of any voice to the state's lawyers
in choosing members of the nominating commission.
A majority of the commission's nine members will always be
persons recommended to the governor by legislative leaders. By
way of comparison, in only seven of the other twenty-two merit selection states do legislators have any involvement in choosing commission members 28 and in all but one of such states they choose
less than a majority of such members. Having only the governor
and legislative leaders involved in choosing the commission's members creates the risk that political considerations and cronyism will
be factors in some of their choices, and members chosen on the basis of such factors may well allow the same factors to influence
their own judgment. There is no reason to believe that the present
leaders of the two parties in the House and Senate are not committed to nominating as commission members only persons of high
quality and integrity. However, there is no guarantee that future
leaders would be equally as committed to recommending to the
governor only the best qualified lawyers available for judges.
There is also no guarantee that future legislative leaders will not
27. Letter from Daniel J. Meador, Professor-Emeritus, University of Virginia
School of Law to Barton P. Jenks, III (March 28, 1995) (copy on file with the Roger
Williams University Law Review). Professor Meador formerly headed the University of Virginia Law School Graduate Program for Judges.
28. These states are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Mexico, New York,
Tennessee and Vermont. See AJS study, supra note 1.
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try to influence their representatives on the commission. The concern of the law should be to avoid politicizing the process. 29 This is
what Rhode Island has moved away from and it should be wary of
encountering the same problems. Unfortunately, the new law fails
to alleviate these concerns because having only the governor and
legislative leaders involved in choosing the commission's members
creates the risk that political considerations and cronyism will always be factors in some of their choices; and members chosen on
this basis may well allow the same factors to influence their own
judgment.
Additionally, the denial of any voice to Rhode Island's lawyers
in choosing the nominating commission's lawyer members is a serious mistake.3 0 Lawyers must try lawsuits and defend persons accused of crimes before the judges appointed by the governor. They
would appear to be more qualified than politicians to judge the
qualifications of their peers. Also, one might suppose that practicing lawyers would have special insight into the qualifications
needed on the bench and the persons available to assume a judicial
role. In ten of the twenty-two merit selection states the state's
31
lawyers or the bar's leadership choose all of the lawyer members,
and in another six the lawyers or bar leadership choose some of the
lawyer members. 32 The AJS recommends that all lawyer members
be chosen by the state's lawyers or bar leadership.
Former Governor Sundlun has stated that the Rhode Island
Bar Association
was not included as a selector of commission members because there was concern that it had largely become a specialinterest group controlled by the personal political opinions of
its presidents, rather than the broad general public interest
29.

See supra, text accompanying note 6. See generally Peter D. Webster, Se-

lection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"Method? 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
1 (1995) ("[Tlhe goals should be to limit, to the extent feasible, the impact of partisan politics and to minimize the effect of other political considerations on the process.") Id. at 38.
30. The Rhode Island Bar Association and the RIght Now organization made
the modest recommendation that two members of the commission be chosen from
among eight attorneys recommended to the governor by the Bar Association. This
recommendation was rejected by the judicial selection law's drafters.
31. Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
South Dakota and Wyoming. See AJS Study, supra note 1.
32. Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, New Mexico, Tennessee and Vermont. See
AJS Study supra note 1.
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...[and that] with the Bar there is no accountability, as there
3
is with elected officials. 3
One may question whether Governor Sundlun's harsh assessment of the Bar Association is justified. But even if it were, the
concerns expressed might be alleviated by having the Bar's members choose by ballot vote the lawyer members of the commission
as is done with respect to all or some lawyer members in nine other
states.3 4 With regard to accountability, it seems very unlikely that
fear of rejection by the voters will cause legislative leaders to
choose only the best qualified people available as their nominees
for commission membership.
The new law does not even require political impartiality in the
selection of commission members. The only suggestion that such
impartiality is intended is its single reference to the commission as
independent and nonpartisan. An express requirement of political
impartiality in the selection of nominating commission members
and in the recommendation of judicial candidates by the commis35
sion should be inserted in the law.

In sharp contrast, the laws of fifteen of the other merit selection states contain provisions intended to preclude political favoritism in the selection of nominating commission members. 3 6 For
example, the laws of Alaska and Iowa provide that commission
members shall be chosen "without regard to political affiliation"
and "without reference to political affiliation" respectively. Kansas
has a similar requirement but it is limited to the non-lawyer members chosen by the governor; the lawyer members are chosen by
the state's lawyers, whose motivations in casting their votes cannot effectively be subjected to scrutiny. Hawaii's law mandates
that its commission "shall be selected and shall operate in a wholly
nonpartisan manner."
Eleven of these fifteen states require a degree of political balance within their nominating commission. In ten of them no more
33. See Governor Sundlun, Selection Law Works, Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 13, 1995.
34. Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma
and Vermont. See AJS Study, supra note 1.
35. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah

and Vermont. Id.
36. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont.

Id.
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than a specified portion of the commission members, or in some
cases of those chosen by certain appointing authorities, may belong
to the same political party; such specified portion is either one-half
or a bare majority.3 7 The eleventh state, New Mexico, requires
that appointments to its commission "shall be made in such manner that each of the two largest political parties [as defined in the
law] shall be equally represented on the commission."
Rhode Island's new law politicizes the commission chairmanship by having the governor choose the chairperson rather than
allowing the commission members to make the choice. It is also
deficient in failing to address the possibility that the chairperson
may temporarily be unavailable to act. In comparison, the law establishing the state's Ethics Commission3 8 provides for an initial
chairperson and vice chairperson to be chosen by the governor and
act for one year, after which the commission itself is to elect its
chairperson and a vice chairperson. In most of the other merit selection states the chairperson is not appointed by the governor.
The commission's chairperson is chosen by its members in
nine states. 3 9 In seven states the supreme court justice serving as
a commission member (usually the chief justice) serves as
chairperson. 40 The governor chooses the chairperson in four
states, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts and Utah. In Kansas
the choice is made by the state bar and in New Mexico the Dean of
the University of New Mexico Law School serves ex officio as
chairperson but does not vote except in the event of a tie. 4 1 All
37. The ten states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska,
New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont. See AJS study supra
note 1. The limitation is one-half of the commission members in Connecticut, Nebraska, Oklahoma (but limited to the governor's appointees), New York (limited to
the governor's appointees and, separately, to those of the Chief Justice of the Court
of Appeals) and Utah. Id. The limitation is a bare majority of the commission
members in Arizona, Colorado, Delaware and Vermont (but limited in the lastmentioned state to the three members elected by the house of representatives and,
separately, to the three members elected by the senate). Id. In South Dakota no
more than two of the three members appointed by the state bar president may be
of the same political party and the two members appointed by the governor cannot
be of the same party. Id.
38. R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-1 et seq.
39. Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and Vermont.
40. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska and
Wyoming.
41. See Goldschmidt, supra note 5.
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these methods are preferable to having the governor choose the
chairperson in that they ensure that the leadership of the commission will be independent. Rhode Island's law is deficient to the extent it has not provided a means to ensure similar independence.
As noted above, the new law requires that supreme court nominees be confirmed not only by the Senate but also separately by
the House. 4 2 In all other states requiring the confirmation of judicial appointees such confirmation is the exclusive province of the
state's senate. In Rhode Island, moreover, no other appointments
by the governor requiring Senate confirmation also require House
confirmation. Even appointees to the federal bench require only
confirmation by the U.S. Senate, although, like judges in Rhode
Island, federal judges serve for life. Although Senate confirmation
is appropriate, the requirement that Supreme Court appointees be
approved not only by the nominating commission, the governor
and the Senate but also by a fourth authority, the House, is both
unreasonable and demeaning to nominees.
The requirement that the Senate and House judiciary committees conduct separate investigations and public hearings on the
qualifications of Supreme Court appointees is even less defensible.
Putting aside the fact that dual confirmations result in unnecessary duplication of effort, multiple investigations and hearings involve extra financial costs; and the state can ill afford outlays of
money solely so that the House can be seen as acting independently of the Senate. The former judicial selection law required
investigations and public hearings concerning the credentials of
nominees for election to the Supreme Court but they were to be
conducted by a single committee made up of the members of the
43
Senate and House judiciary committees.
One of the most objectionable features of the new law, without
counterpart in the law of any other merit selection state, is the
provision that if the Senate (or, in the case of an appointment to
the Supreme Court, the House) neither confirms nor rejects a judicial appointee of the governor within the time allowed for it to act,
the governor must appoint someone else to fill the vacancy. If the
appointee is in any way controversial, such provision permits legislators to stall until the time for action runs out and thereby avoid
42. This is obviously a holdover from the days of the Grand Committee. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
43. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-1.1-2 (repealed 1994).
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having to cast a vote on the appointee that may offend a substantial group of their constituents. It is also grossly unfair to appointees who have undergone exhaustive scrutiny by the nominating
commission and have had to make available to the public details
about their lives that they might well have preferred to keep private. 4 4 The provision is especially pernicious when an appointee to
the Supreme Court is to be considered for confirmation by the Senate and House, for even if one of the houses were to vote to confirm
the appointee the other's inaction within the time allowed would
deny the appointee confirmation.
Permitting the commission to disqualify a candidate for bias
against a historically disadvantaged class of persons is unnecessary, for it could and should do so even if the law did not authorize
it. However, requiring it to consider a candidate's sensitivity to
historically disadvantaged classes inappropriately injects the concepts of political correctness and affirmative action into the nomination process. Presumably an otherwise qualified candidate who
can show that he or she has supported minority causes (for example, by contributing to the United Negro College Fund) or feminist
causes is to be preferred to a candidate with better professional
credentials who cannot demonstrate active support for any such
causes.
The merit selection laws of several other states seek to promote racial, ethnic and gender diversity45 but none of them requires that sensitivity to historically disadvantaged classes be
46
considered in evaluating a candidate's fitness for judicial office.
44. See note 17, supra for a description of the type of information candidates
for nomination must provide.
45. The Arizona law provides that the commission's makeup "shall, to the extent feasible, reflect the diversity of the population of the state" and the Tennessee
law mandates that the appointing authorities "shall appoint persons who approximate the population of the state with respect to race, including the dominant ethnic minority population, and gender." In Florida at least three of the commission
members must be "a member of a racial or ethnic minority group or a woman" and
in Iowa "no more than a simple majority of the members appointed shall be of the
same gender." See Goldschmidt, supra note 5.
46. Professor Yelnosky suggests that the commission's rules should require it
"to publish an annual report of the race, ethnicity, and gender of the pool of applicants considered by the Commission in the previous year." Michael J. Yelnosky,
Rhode Island's JudicialNominating Commission: Can "Reform" Become Reality?,
1 R.W.U. L. Rev. at 87 (1996). Assuming that requiring such an annual report is
within the commission's rulemaking power, see supra text accompanying note 15, a
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Seven of the ten other states which disqualify nominating
commission members from being appointed as judges for a period
of time beyond the time of their service on the commission specify a
period of at least two years. 4 7 In Rhode Island, the period of disqualification is for one year after the end of a member's term on the
commission, even if this results from resignation rather than expiration of the member's term.
The one year period of disqualification provided for in the
Rhode Island law is too short. If a former commission member
were to become a candidate for judicial appointment shortly after
the period of his or her disqualification had ended, the almost certain result would be that a majority of the commission members
called upon to consider the candidate's qualifications would be persons with whom the candidate had served on the commission. If
the commission voted to recommend the candidate to the governor
it could be accused of favoritism. Alternatively, it might decline to
recommend the candidate, notwithstanding his or her outstanding
qualifications for fear of being accused of favoritism. The most
likely result, however, would be that the candidate's former colleagues would consider it necessary to recuse themselves from conproposition which is not entirely free of doubt, the desirability of having such a
report is open to serious question.
If the report does no more than provide information about the pool of applicants, it should be unobjectionable. However, Professor Yelnosky's use of the word
.considered" suggests that he contemplates a report providing more information.
Thus, a truly informative report would identify with respect to each court vacancy
the race, ethnicity and gender of not only all applicants for the position but also
those interviewed by the commission and those recommended to the governor. The
requirement of publishing such a detailed report, if that is what Yelnosky has in
mind, would increase the pressure on the commission, already existing by reason
of the law's language, to establish a de facto quota system in recommending candidates to fill judicial vacancies.
If the commission were to successfully resist such pressure and the result was
underrepresentation of minorities among candidates interviewed or recommended
to the governor, some political leaders from the minority community and other
prominent members of such community who make it a practice to publicly condemn what they see as discrimination could be expected to charge the commission
with racial discrimination. This would force the commission to defend itself
against baseless charges and would exert even more pressure on it to employ a
quota system in interviewing judicial candidates and recommending them to the
governor.
47. The seven states and their periods of disqualification are as follows: Colorado (three years), Connecticut (two years), Florida (two years), Hawaii (three
years), Indiana (three years), Oklahoma (five years), and Tennessee (two years).
See Goldschmidt, supra note 5.
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sidering his candidacy and, doing so, would make it impossible for
the candidate to receive the five votes of approval needed in order
for him to be recommended to the governor. A situation with the
consequences just described should not be allowed to arise.
The one year disqualification period should be replaced with a
period of at least two and preferably three years. Also, as is done
in Connecticut and Delaware, the former commission member
should be barred from even being considered for judicial appointment during the period of disqualification. If the General Assembly is unwilling to change the one year period it should at the very
least bar the commission from even accepting an application for
judicial appointment from a former commission member before the
one year period has ended.
B.

Flaws of Execution

The new law contains numerous errors that could be remedied
by simple amendments. For example, the time allowed for the governor to choose from among the nominating commission's nominees is a mere ten days for Supreme Court vacancies. This is
significantly shorter than the time allowed in any other merit selection state. 4S It is inadequate to permit the governor and his or
her legal advisers to investigate and consider the qualifications of
each nominee, because of their many other responsibilities. A consequence is that on more than one occasion the governor has failed
49
to meet the deadline.
Fifteen of the other merit selection states impose a time limit
for action by the governor. The time allowed ranges from fifteen to
sixty days, with sixty and thirty days being by far the most common period. 50
The General Assembly should enact an amendment to the law
allowing the governor at least 30 days to choose among the com48. See AJS Study, supra note 1.
49. Perhaps recognizing that it, rather than the governor was at fault, the

General Assembly has ignored the violation of the time limit imposed by it. See
Yelnosky, supra note 41. He points out that "both Governors Sundlun and Almond

have ignored the statutory time limits to give themselves more opportunity for
deliberation." Id.
50. The times allowed are as follows: 60 days -Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and Oklahoma; 45 days - Alaska; 30 days - Hawaii, Iowa,
New Mexico, New York, Utah and Wyoming; and 15 days - Colorado. See Gold-

schmidt, supra note 5.
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mission's nominees in order to allow an appropriate amount of
time for reflection. At the same time it should consider dealing
with the contingency of the governor failing to act within the time
allowed by providing, as the laws of many states with a time limit
do, that in such event the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, rather than the governor, shall choose one of
51
the commission's nominees.
Unlike their counterparts in a number of other merit selection
states, Rhode Island commission members are ineligible to be
reappointed when their terms end. Therefore, when a member
fails for any reason to complete his or her term of office, the person
appointed to serve out the remainder of the term cannot be reappointed no matter how short the period of service has been. Similarly, the four initial members of the commission who serve for one
or two years, cannot be reappointed. Barring such members from
being reappointed makes little sense, especially since it may be difficult for the appointing authorities to find people of superior quality who are willing to serve on the commission.
The law should be amended to permit a member serving for
the unexpired balance of a predecessor's term to be reappointed for
a full term if the unexpired balance does not exceed a specified duration (e.g., two years or thirty months). Serious consideration
should also be given to allowing members to serve for two full
terms so long as they are not consecutive.
The requirement that the commission comply with the state's
open meetings law should be modified, if not reconsidered. Under
that law meetings to consider candidates for judgeships must be
public except for discussions of the "character or physical or mental
health" of such candidates. 5 2 The term "character" is susceptible of
51. The ten states in which the chief justice of the supreme court is to be substituted for the governor are Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. In Hawaii and Missouri, the nominating commission itself acts in lieu of the governor. Id.
52. Section III of the Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Nominating
Commission specifies that judicial candidate interviews shall be conducted in open
session except that "[t]hose portions of an interview in which confidential information would be discussed may be held in closed session at the discretion of the Commission or at the the request of the interviewee." The general requirement that
interviews be conducted in public conforms to the requirements of the open meetings law. However, the exception to such general requirement cited above is nowhere authorized in the open meetings law and appears to be an unwarranted
expansion of the commission's authority to discuss in private the "character or
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being construed either broadly or narrowly, so the exception provides no assurance that highly personal information about a candidate (for example, a bitter divorce, traffic violations, having been a
defendant in a law suit or a past bankruptcy) will not be disclosed
to the general public.
The open meetings law also permits discussions of "job performance" to be conducted in private if those whose job performance is to be reviewed do not object and Professor Yelnosky argues
that this exemption serves as a basis for interviewing candidates
for judicial office in executive session. The exemption undoubtedly
is intended to protect employees of state and local government
agencies whose performance is being evaluated or questioned from
having their privacy invaded and being exposed to possible public
embarrassment. It cannot reasonably be interpreted as extending
to the qualifications of lawyers who seek judicial office.
The use in the law of the words "job performance" implies a
preexisting relationship of some kind between the person whose
job performance is being reviewed and the reviewing authority,
and there is no such relationship between the commission and applicants for judicial office. Had the law intended to create an exemption for the interviewing of applicants for employment one
would expect it to have included "qualifications for employment" or
"employment qualifications" among the subjects permitted to be
discussed in closed session. Moreover, lawyers are professionals
and do not perform "jobs" as that term is commonly understood but
instead practice law.
Rhode Island's open meetings law is one of the strictest in the
country. The likely result of full compliance with its requirements
will be to deter some well qualified lawyers from becoming candidates for judgeships, inhibit commission members from asking
candidates tough questions for fear of causing them public embarrassment, and inhibit candid discussion among the commission
members about the relative merits of candidates.
Probably because of these considerations thirteen merit selection states provide that for the most part the proceedings and
records of their nominating commissions must be kept confidential

physical or mental health" of persons interviewed by it. Uniform Rules of Procedure for the Judicial Nominating Commission § III, p. 2 (Jan. 19, 1995).
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or, in a few cases, that the commission's deliberations and voting
53
are to be confidential.
It unquestionably is desirable that the commission be able to
conduct its deliberations in private but it does not follow that it is
free to do so. Nothing in the Open Meetings Law exempts the commission's deliberations from the requirements of the law, and it is
stretching the meaning of "character" beyond all reason to say that
deliberations concerning the relative merits of candidates are an
issue of character and, therefore, can be conducted in executive
54
session.
53. In nine states the nominating commission's proceedings and records are
for the most part required to be kept confidential. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Utah and Vermont and in another four states its deliberations concerning the merits of
candidates and its voting on candidates are kept confidential. These states are
Florida, Iowa, Nebraska and Tennessee. See Goldschmidt, supra note 5.
54. Professor Yelnosky cites an Unofficial Opinion from the Attorney General's office as support for his view that the commission can rely on the "job performance" exemption as authority for it to interview applicants for judicial office in
closed session. Yelnosky, supra note 41 at 125. The Opinion is a letter responding
to a letter from the editor of the Westerly Sun and does not purport to speak for
anyone other than the Special Assistant to the Attorney General who signed it
(thus, it uses language like "It is my opinion," "I believe" and "I do not feel"). It is
unpersuasive insofar as it addresses the applicability of the open meetings law to
the Westerly Town Council's consideration of candidates for the position of Town
Manager. Referring to the Town Council's interviewing of such candidates in
closed session, the opinion letter says:
The Council reviewed applications and, by a majority vote of the Council,
selected certain individuals for an interview. According to Mr. Turo [previously identified as Legal Counsel to the Council] "the purpose of the interview is to determine the qualifications of the applicant to serve as
Town Manager." Indeed, the primary goal of job interviews is for both
interviewers and interviewees to discuss the job performance, character,
or physical or mental health of the applicants (emphasis added). Consequently, it is my opinion that the Council's discussions with the applicants concerning their employment qualifications were appropriate for
closed session under the Open Meetings Law (emphasis added). I believe
that 42-46-5 (a) (1) of the Open Meetings Act contemplates job interviews
and permits public bodies to hold such interviews in closed session.
The trouble with the quoted language is that it assumes, without giving any
reasons, that "job performance" is intended to refer not only to government employees but also to applicants for government employment and, as to such applicants, can be construed as "employment qualifications." Lacking any reasoned
foundation and having no official status, the opinion is entitled to little if any
respect.
Moreover, candidates for a Town Manager position are not professionals, so
even if the unofficial opinion were valid as to nonprofessionals, it does not follow
that it would be valid for professionals like applicants for judicial office. As is
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Notwithstanding the lack of clear authority for its action, the
commission has adopted a rule permitting it to conduct its deliberations in private, perhaps in reliance upon its general rulemaking
power.5 5 However, it can rely upon that power only by disregarding a well established principle of statutory construction. The very
same paragraph in the law which gives the commission rulemaking authority also requires that it comply with the Open Meetings
Law. The rulemaking authority is general whereas the requirements of the Open Meetings Law are very specific. Adherence to
generally accepted rules of statutory construction therefore requires that when the application of general provision would conflict with a specific provision pertaining to the same subject
56
matter, the specific provision must prevail.
It is unlikely that the commission's interpretation of its authority will undergo legal challenge for the result achieved is desirable, but had the law's drafters done their job properly, the
commission's authority to act in closed session could not be questioned. The drafters could easily have given the commission authority to override the requirements of the Open Meetings Law
within specified limits without doing violence to the principles of
57
open government.
pointed out in the text preceding this footnote, the practice of law is not commonly

thought of as a "job."
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
56. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 257 ("Where there is in the same statute a
specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense
would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control . . ."); 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 347(b) ("Unless a legislative intention to the contrary clearly appears, special or particular provisions control over general
provisions, terms or expressions."). The full applicability of the open meetings law
still leaves the nominating commission ample room to adopt rules that do not conflict with the requirements of such law.
57. Professor Yelnosky states that "if applicant interviews may take place in
private consistent with the Open Meetings Law, deliberations about the relative
merits of the 'job performance, character or physical or mental health of a person
or persons' would seem to do so as well." Yelnosky, supra note 41. A major weakness of this argument is that it relies upon the proposition that the "job performance" exemption serves as a basis for conducting individual applicant interviews in
private, although as is indicated there is good reason to believe that such exemption is limited to government employees whose performance is to be evaluated and
cannot be applied with respect to applicants for judicial office.
Yelnosky buttresses his argument with the statement that "[p]rivate deliberations are a staple of merit selection systems nationally, and Mr. Jenks agrees that
they seem essential to encourage the robust, full and frank debate necessary for
the commissioners to identify the most qualified candidates." Yelonsky, supra note
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Another deficiency in the law, apparently resulting from inept
or careless drafting, is its provision that if a judicial appointee of
the governor is not confirmed within the time allowed, the governor must appoint "some other person" in his or her place. Read
literally, the quoted words can be construed as meaning anyone of
the governor's choice but reasonably interpreted they must mean
one of the remaining nominees recommended to the governor by
the commission. However, the latter interpretation results in an
injustice: Formal rejection of an appointee entitles the governor to
a full new panel of nominees from which to choose, whereas rejection of the nominee through failure to act within the time allowed
limits the governor's choice to less than a full panel of nominees. If
construed in this way, the legislators with the authority to confirm
or deny confirmation to the appointee could conceivably force the
governor to select a particular nominee by refusing to act on any
other name sent to it by the governor.
Fortunately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recently issued an advisory opinion requiring that whenever an appointee of
the governor is not confirmed because of formal rejection, de facto
rejection through failure of the confirming authority to act within
the time allowed, or the appointee's voluntary withdrawal of his or
her candidacy for confirmation the governor is entitled to a full
58
panel of nominees from which to choose a new appointee.
41. All very true. However, the fact that private deliberations are a common practice nationally and are highly desirable does not serve to make them permissible
under the open meetings law.
Rhode Island was one of the last of two of the fifty states to enact an open
meetings law and, notwithstanding the opportunity the General Assembly had to
borrow from the best of the other forty-eight state laws, its law is one of the most
poorly drafted. Had it been well drafted, there could be no controversy over
whether applicant interviews and deliberations about the relative merits of applicants can be conducted in executive session. The remedy for the law's deficiencies
is not tortured interpretations to find in the law meanings that its language does
not justify, but instead is amendment of the law to eliminate the deficiencies. For
example of an carefully crafted open meetings law see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-6-401

et seq.
58. In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission) 668
A.2d 1246 (R.I. 1996). The advisory opinion, signed by the four sitting members of
the Court, was issued in response to a request by the by Governor Almond after a

Supreme Court appointee withdrew his candidacy during the confirmation proceeding. The Court distinguished in its opinion between appointees whose confirmation is rejected formally or de facto or who withdraw their candidacy and
appointees whose death or disability during the confirmation proceeding precludes

their being confirmed. With regard to the latter appointees, the Court expressed
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Another error is the law's failure to specify how the successors
of commission members whose terms expire shall be chosen. It
could easily have said that successors shall be chosen in the same
manner as the members they replace. Until the omission is rectified by amendment of the law, the law will, out of practical necessity, undoubtedly be construed as saying what it does not say but
should have said.
Finally, a provision in the law whose implications were not
fully thought out by its drafters is the authority given to the governor to remove a commission member for "conviction of a criminal
offense." On its face the provision seems reasonable. However, it
would prevent the governor from removing a member upon his or
her indictment for a serious crime, such as fraud or embezzlement.
It is unthinkable that a person under indictment for such a crime
should be able to continue participating, perhaps for many months,
in choosing the state's judges. The law should be amended to permit the governor to suspend or remove a commission member who
has been charged with a felony or perhaps the suspension or removal should be made automatic. The governor might also be
given discretionary authority to suspend a commission member
who has been charged with a misdemeanor.
CONCLUSION

Although Rhode Island's new judicial selection procedure appears to be working reasonably well, it has been in effect only since
the latter part of 1994, a relatively short period of time. Because of
its flaws there can be no assurance that it will continue to work
well in the future.
The legislators involved in drafting the law not only had a considerable amount of pertinent data supplied by the AJS but also
had access to the merit selection laws of other states. However,
they appear to have given scant attention to these sources of inforthe opinion that the governor's choice of their replacements is limited to the remaining members of the existing panel of nominees recommended by the nominating commission. The only reason given for making the distinction is that "the
integrity of the judicial selection process would be maintained by the Governor's
selection of a different nominee from the same list that contained the deceased or
disabled nominee." Id. at 1250. The validity of the distinction made by the Court
is open to question and the judicial selection law should be amended to provide
that whenever an appointee is not confirmed, for whatever reason, the governor is
entitled to have a full panel of nominees from which to make another appointment.
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mation. Partly as a result, Rhode Island's judicial selection law is
badly flawed in a number of important respects, and in the words
of Professor Daniel Meador "appears to be a model of what not to
do in creating a nominating commission system." It is hoped that
the General Assembly will address the law's defects at the earliest
possible moment.

